Special Operations & Situations Policy
| Date | Code | Version | Contact |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2003-02-06 | CPS-011 | 1.00 | Facility Advisory Board (FAB) |
1. PURPOSE:
This Center Policy Statement (CPS) describes ARTCC policies regarding the handling of certain special operations and simulation situations. These include pilot-initiated situations such as in-flight emergencies and controller-initiated situations such as services outages or runway closures.
2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
This CPS shall be maintained, revised, updated or cancelled by the ZOA Facility Advisory Board and shall be effective unless there is a conflict with the VATUSA/VATSIM policies in which case they shall supercede these policies.
3. DISTRIBUTION:
This CPS is applicable to all ZOA ARTCC controllers and pilots who operate within ZOA ARTCC airspace.
4. BACKGROUND:
To enrich the flight simulation experience, there is often a desire to simulate challenging situations beyond routine flight operations. In addition, sometime real-world or simulator-based events cause unexpected situations to develop. This policy statement sets forth guidelines for pilots and controllers as to what situations ZOA ARTCC controllers will recognize and be trained for, as well as providing pilots with consistent services for special operations.
5. CONTROLLER-INITIATED SITUATIONS:
NAVAIDs
Unless specifically designed as part of ZOA sponsored event, all NAVAIDs included the default MS-FS scenery shall be considered operational. Controllers shall not simulate NAVAIDs being taken out of service.
Any NAVAID determined by the Facility Engineer, not be operating with as needed to support published instrument procedures shall be identified in a ZOA ARTCC pilot NOTAM distributed on the ZOA web site.
IAP Availability
APP controllers of grade S-3 and above shall be authorized to simulate situations making specific Instrument Approach Procedures unavailable, but must obtain authorization from the Shift Supervisor, who may deny the request based on conditions. Reasons issued to pilots may be for items such as terrain obstructions (cranes, construction) or temporary suspension for safety reasons, but should not rely on NAVAID outages as these will appear to be working to the pilot.
Runway Closure
TWR controllers of grade S-3 and above shall be authorized to simulate situations closing specific runways, but must obtain authorization from the Shift Supervisor, who may deny the request based on conditions.
Pilots may attempt landings on runways closed under section 5(c)(1) at their own risk. ATC shall not issue landing clearances to these aircraft.
Airport Closure
APP or CTR controllers of grade S-3 and above shall be authorized to simulate situations closing specific airports, or requesting diversions from or to specific airports, but must obtain authorization from the Shift Supervisor, who may deny the request based on conditions.
Pilots may attempt landings at airports closed under section 5(d)(1) at their own risk. ATC shall not issue landing clearances to these aircraft.
Delays and Holding
No controller shall delay or hold and an aircraft for a simulated situation of the controllers initiative. Delays or holds shall only be issued due to actual traffic or workload conditions. This section shall not apply to a ZOA sponsored event that specifically calls for scenarios that involve holding operations. This section does not prevent a pilot from requesting a hold.
Use of Virtual Government Aircraft
CTR controllers of grade C-1 and above shall be authorized to request tasking of government or military aircraft for the following situations:
Escort of distressed aircraft.
Aeromedical evacuation at sites of downed aircraft or potential crash sites.
Search and rescue (SAR) of missing aircraft.
Interception / identification of intruders into controlled airspace or special use airspace.
Escort and Interception operations may only be conducted
when the interceptor is TCAS equipped. TCAS contact must be established within 20nm of the target and maintained during the interception.
so long as the interceptor maintains VMC within 20nm of target.
During escort and interception operations controllers shall insure separation between the interceptor and target until the interceptor reports visual contact, at which point Military Assumes Responsibility for Separation for Aircraft (MARSA).
ZOA ARTCC shall develop LOAs with virtual government/military organizations to set forth specific procedures for these operations.
Simulation of Real-World Events
Controllers shall not attempt to simulate real-world events or activities described by actual NOTAMs or Special Flight Rules (SFRs) unless these events or activities are specifically announced by a ZOA ARTCC pilot NOTAM. This shall insure consistent handling by ZOA controllers to pilots.
6. PILOT-INITIATED SITUATIONS:
In-Flight Emergencies and Practice Emergency Training
Definitions:
Actual Emergency. This type of event is a malfunction or incident beyond the pilots control and without the pilot's prior knowledge. This includes a computer equipment failure such as a joystick disconnect, an unexpected apparent malfunction of the simulator software, such as poorly modeled flight parameters that threaten controlled flight, or an event that prevents the pilot from being able to operate the aircraft such as an external incident that forces a pilot to step away from the computer for a brief time. The objective of this type of event is for the pilot to resume normal operations and flight if possible.
Simulated Emergency. This type of event is a "programmed" random failure of an aircraft system, such as using the default failure mode of the simulator or third party panel system failure options, simulated weather effects on systems such as instrument or airframe icing, fuel crisis, and engine failures. In this case, the pilot or simulator has set the conditions for the distress, but the pilot may not know if or when they will occur. The objective of this type of event is to add to simulation experience by challenging the pilot with unique conditions. Note that these events shall be subject to all VATSIM and VATUSA policies restricting their type.
Practice Emergency. This type of event is the "virtual" counterpart to real-world training maneuvers, such as practicing power-off landings or autorotations. This is not an actual emergency, but a planned training exercise. The objective of this event is pilot training.
Controllers shall make every effort to accommodate aircraft in distress and urgency calls, during normal operations, workload permitting, so long as pilots operate within the procedures outlined by NOTAM 2003-01.
Pilots are asked to refrain from initiating simulated emergencies during major fly-in events.
Controllers shall use judgment to attempt to meet simulated or actual emergency aircraft needs, but this will be balanced so as not to disrupt the overall orderly flow of traffic in their area as well as the simulation experience of all local pilots.
Pilots attempting to land distressed aircraft should expect to be vectored to secondary fields to bring them clear major traffic flows.
Pilots conducting training operations, such as practice engine failures, are asked to follow these guidelines:
Training operations should be conducted while operating under VFR (this means the operation must conducted in Visual Meteorological Conditions and below 18000' MSL).
If the operation is to terminate with a landing or option approach to an airport within Class B, C, or D airspace, the pilot should coordinate with ATC by asking to initiate a practice power-off approach to the field.
ATC shall have the authority to deny the operation at any point, or direct the operation to terminate at an alternate airport with suitable runway parameters for the aircraft type.
Loss of Communications
VATSIM code of conduct section B(5) requires that all pilots be available for communications with ATC through the text system as a minimum. ZOA ARTCC controllers shall not recognize simulated radio failure situations. Loss off communications or identification of aircraft squawking 7600 shall initiate efforts by controllers to "debug" and restore communications.
Military / Government Operations
Special Use Airspace (SUA).
Military aircraft may reserve use of Military Operating Areas (MOAs), Restricted Areas, Warning Areas, and Military Training Routes (MTRs) with OAK_CTR when online.
Military aircraft must contact ATC prior to entry and use of SUA.
ATC may deny reservation/use of the SUA to an aircraft or flight...
until all civil aircraft are clear of the SUA, or...
if military users can not accept clearances which will provide separation from civil aircraft until the SUA is clear of civil aircraft, or...
if the requested operation has not been coordinated with military users already reserving, or cleared into the MOA.
MARSA shall be in effect inside SUA.
Military aircraft operating within SUA shall be exempt from FAR speed and altitude restrictions during tactical training.
In-flight Refueling. ZOA ARTCC Controllers shall coordinate military In-flight refueling operations only as specified by LOA with IAMPSO organizations. Non-IAMPSO-affiliated military aircraft wishing to conduct in-flight refueling will be vectored above or away from normal traffic flows, as specific by SOP-005.
Supersonic Flight. Supersonic flight may be conducted 20nm offshore or within reserved SUA (except on MTRs) per section 6(c)(1).
ZOA ARTCC shall develop LOAs with virtual government/military organizations to set forth specific procedures for these operations.